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China and Western countries have repeatedly portrayed each other as 
potential or actual adversaries in cyberspace. Yet, both sides ostensibly 
subscribe to an international consensus that cyber operations must be 
subjected to the rule of law. Against this background, the article 
examines five key aspects of the rule of law in cyberspace, which are 
ordinarily understood as areas of contention: (1) preferred method of 
identification and development of international law; (2) competing 
models of cyberspace governance; (3) application of sovereignty to 
cyberspace; (4) question of militarization of cyberspace; and (5) legality 
of cyber espionage. Our analysis demonstrates that it is inaccurate to 
view China and the West as sharply divided and competing camps. 
Rather, the emerging picture reveals a web of relationships and views 
that reflect an overall trajectory of convergence, even if modest in 





1. Within the time-span of one generation, cyberspace has become an 
environment where human relationships are forged and broken, where 
economic deals are struck and subverted, and where States engage in open 
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diplomacy as well as covert espionage. Its importance for economic growth 
and human progress cannot be underestimated. In 2014 alone, the Internet 
sector contributed 6 percent of real gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
United States and 7 percent in China.1 As of March 2017, nearly half of the 
world’s population was online2 and this figure is expected to grow to almost 
60 percent by the end of this decade.3 
 2. In parallel with the growing importance of cyberspace for virtually every 
aspect of human interaction, States have recognized the potential strengths 
and vulnerabilities of this new domain. Real and perceived threats range from 
cybercrime and cyber espionage4 to rather less realistic concerns about an 
impending “cyber Pearl Harbor”.5 They have rattled the imagination and the 
composure of State and non-State actors alike. Meanwhile, cyberspace has 
proven a crucial “enabler” of China’s emergence as a great power on the 
world stage. 6  Rightly or wrongly, China and Western countries have 
repeatedly portrayed each other as potential or actual adversaries in 
cyberspace.  
 3. Many incidents could be emphasised in the chequered history of the 
relationship between these two sides. Already in 1997, the US military was 
                                                        
1 Internet Association, New Report Calculates the Size of the Internet 
Economy (10 Dec. 2015), (internetassociation.org/121015econreport); Kou 
Jie, Internet economy 7% of China’s GDP, Global Times (30 Oct. 2015), 
(www.globaltimes.cn/content/949867.shtml). 
2 Internet World Stats: Usage and Population Statistics (25 Mar. 2017), 
(www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm). 
3 Forrester, Forrester Research World Online Population Forecast, 2015 to 
2020 (Global) (7 Oct. 2015), (www.forrester.com/go?objectid=RES127940). 
4  For a recent example of the destructive potential of both, particularly in 
combination, see, e.g., Sam Jones, Timeline of cyber attack: How 
WannaCry’s secret weapon spread, Financial Times (14 May 2017), 
(https://www.ft.com/content/82b01aca-38b7-11e7-821a-6027b8a20f23) 
(reporting on the spread of the ransomware program WannaCry, which was 
allegedly based on a repurposed cyber espionage tool stolen from the US 
National Security Agency and which had, by the time of writing, infected 
and disabled over 200,000 computers around the world, including many that 
were vital to the national critical infrastructure of various countries). 
5 Sean Lawson, Does 2016 Mark the End of Cyber Pearl Harbor Hysteria? (7 
Dec. 2016), (www.forbes.com/sites/seanlawson/2016/12/07/does-2016-
mark-the-end-of-cyber-pearl-harbor-hysteria). 
6 Jon R. Lindsay, Introduction: China and Cybersecurity: Controversy and 
Context, in: Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung and Derek S. Reveron (eds.), 
China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital 
Domain (2015), 2. 




reportedly preparing for high-tech contingency operations involving China.7 
In 2010, the relationship came under strain following Google’s very public 
decision to withdraw from the Chinese market, which it justified in part as a 
response to alleged sophisticated cyber intrusions originating from China.8 
Since then, the two sides have traded multiple accusations of cyber attacks. 
For instance, China claimed the US “was behind” cyber operations against the 
Chinese search engine Baidu,9 and the US issued an indictment against five 
members of the Chinese military for alleged acts of economic cyber 
espionage.10 There is little sign that this latent conflict, a “Cyber Cold War” 
perhaps, will be abating any time in the near future.11 
 4. Although the two sides disagree on the factual circumstances 
underpinning these confrontations, they are in agreement on the general need 
to subject operations in cyberspace to the rule of law. This is not in doubt; 
after all, like any other human activity, conduct in cyberspace is not beyond 
the regulatory reach of States. Moreover, the borderless nature of cyberspace 
and its impact on key State interests necessitate a normative response at the 
level of international law. This is consonant with the approach of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has emphasized the international 
dimension of the principle of the rule of law in several of its rulings. 12 
                                                        
7 Thomas Rid, Rise of the Machines: A Cybernetic History (2016), 311. 
8 Google, A New Approach to China (12 Jan. 2010), 
(googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html). 
9 Bill Gertz, Beijing accuses U.S. of cyberwarfare, Washington Times (26 Jan. 
2010), (www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jan/26/beijing-accuses-us-
of-cyberwarfare). 
10 US Department of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the 
Press Conference Announcing U.S. Charges Against Five Chinese Military 
Hackers for Cyber Espionage (19 May 2014), 
(www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2014/ag-speech-140519.html). 
11 See, e.g., US DoD, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 (26 Apr. 
2016), 
(www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Militar
y%20Power%20Report.pdf), 64 (noting that computer systems owned by 
the US government continued to be targeted for intrusions in 2015, some of 
which appeared to be attributable to China’s government and military); 
Chen Weihua, China, US talk cyber standards, China Daily (12 May 2016), 
(www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-05/12/content_25240074.htm) 
(reporting that attacks originating from the US had not decreased following 
the US-China summit in Sept. 2015). 
12 See, e.g., Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1950, 
266, 284 (contrasting “arbitrary action” with the rule of law); Case 
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Furthermore, as Brian Tamanaha observed in On the Rule of Law, “[i]f there is 
to be an enduring international rule of law, it must be seen to reflect the 
interests of the entire international community”. 13  Understanding the 
differences between the Chinese and Western approaches to the international 
rule of law in cyberspace accordingly takes on urgent importance. 
 5. This article argues that the shared general commitment of both sides 
to the rule of law acts as a powerful force of convergence that will lead to 
gradually overcoming, or at least narrowing, key points of contention. This is 
a dramatically different picture than that painted by numerous scholars, who 
typically speak of competing “camps” of countries holding fundamentally 
dissimilar views on matters of cyberspace.14 We challenge this view and argue 
that, upon close inspection, China and the West are slowly coming together 
on many central issues, including Internet governance or sovereignty in 
cyberspace. 
 6. The article counterposes Chinese views, approaches and positions 
with those held by Western countries. Two notes of caution are in order. 
First, although the US is the most prominent and the most powerful of the 
category of countries referred to herein as “the West” and for this reason it 
receives the lion’s share of attention in this article, it bears noting that the US 
views are naturally not always identical or even similar to those of other 
Western countries. Therefore, we have attempted to highlight such “internal” 
discrepancies.  
 7. Second, although by any account Russia is—next to the US and 
China—the third major cyber power in the world, we do not analyse its 
positions in detail in this article. While it would certainly be interesting to 
triangulate the Russian views vis-à-vis its Chinese and Western counterparts, 
doing so would take us outside of the scope of the article and as such it has to 
                                                                                                                                
Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (USA v. Italy), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1989, 15, 76, para. 128 (“Arbitrariness is not so much something 
opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law.”). 
13 Brian Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (2004), 136. 
For a theoretical discussion of the notion of international rule of law, see 
further, e.g., Sir Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law, 36 German 
YIL (1992), 5; James Crawford, International Law and the Rule of Law, 
Adelaide LR (2003), 3; Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 
56 American JCL (2008), 331; Robert McCorquodale, Defining the 
International Rule of Law: Defying Gravity?, 65 ICLQ (2016), 277. 
14 See, e.g., Scott Shackleford and Amanda Craig, Beyond the New “Digital 
Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet 
Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 Stanford JIL (2014), 119, 135; 
Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 Georgetown LJ 
(2015), 317, 333; Nigel Inkster, China’s Cyber Power (2015), 9. 




remain a possible subject of future research. Nonetheless, we do refer to the 
Russian views on occasion in order to cast a clearer light on the Chinese 
position on issues where the two might be or have been conflated. 
 8. The structure of the article is as follows. In the next section, we 
examine the extent of the commitment of States on both sides of the 
supposed East-West divide to the international rule of law in cyberspace and 
consider the probable reasons for their shared understanding. We then 
analyse five specific aspects of the rule of law in cyberspace on which China 
and Western countries are ordinarily understood as taking fundamentally 
incompatible views. These perceived areas of contention include the preferred 
method of identification and development of international law (section III); 
the supposed clash between the “multilateral” and “multi-stakeholder” 
models of Internet governance (section IV); the application of the concept of 
sovereignty to cyberspace (section V); the allegations of militarization of 
cyberspace levelled against the West (section VI); and cyber espionage under 
international law (section VII). The final section of the article summarizes our 
argument and offers some concluding observations. 
 
 
II. International rule of law in cyberspace: Shared concept, diverse 
conceptions 
 
9. In the “path-breaking”15 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace, the Obama 
Administration declared for the first time that it “support[s] the rule of law in 
cyberspace”, and that “[l]ong-standing international norms guiding state 
behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also apply in cyberspace”. 16 
Expressions of commitment to the rule of international law by other Western 
States soon followed. For example, the European Union’s 2013 Cybersecurity 
Strategy stated that “[i]n its international cyberspace policy, the EU will seek to 
promote openness and freedom of the Internet, encourage efforts to develop 
norms of behaviour and apply existing international laws in cyberspace”.17 
                                                        
15 Paul Meyer, Outer Space and Cyberspace: A Tale of Two Security Realms, 
in: Anna-Maria Osula and Henry Rõigas (eds), International Cyber Norms: 
Legal, Policy & Industry Perspectives (2016), 164. 
16 The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, 
Security, and Openness in a Networked World (2011), 
(www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/internationalstrategy_
cyberspace.pdf), 9 (hereinafter “US International Strategy”). 
17 EU, European Commission and High Representative of the European 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Cybersecurity Strategy of the 
European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, JOIN(2013) 1 
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 10. China has likewise clearly declared full support for the rule of law 
approach to the governance of cyberspace. As early as 2010, in response to 
criticism levied by Western countries against Internet regulation in China,18 
the Chinese government stated that “China abides by the general obligations 
and any specific commitment as a WTO member, [… and] guarantees the 
citizens’ freedom of speech on the Internet as well as the public’s right to 
know, to participate, to be heard and to oversee in accordance with the law.”19 
This policy statement marked the first expression of China’s view on the rule 
of law in cyberspace. At the 2012 Budapest International Conference on 
Cyberspace, Huang Huikang, the Head of the Chinese Delegation, reaffirmed 
this commitment when he noted, “[a]s an old Chinese saying goes, nothing 
can be accomplished without rules. […] Although cyberspace is virtual, it 
needs rules and norms to follow.”20 And at the 6th China-US Internet Industry 
Forum held in Beijing in 2013, the Chinese representative observed, “[w]e 
need a cyberspace with international rule of law […] The rule of law is the 
best approach to Internet governance because it is in parallel with the 
development of human civilization today which seeks to operate in a rule-
based environment”.21  
 11. Since these first proclamations by the US and China, an 
international consensus on the importance of a rule-of-law approach to 
                                                                                                                                
final (7 Feb. 2013), 2 (hereinafter “EU Cybersecurity Strategy”). 
18 In particular, it has been claimed that China’s Internet regulations violated 
China’s obligations under various agreements of the World Trade 
Organization, as well as its international human rights obligations on 
freedom of speech (although China has yet to accede to the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). See, e.g., David 
Coursey, US May Use WTO to Resolve Google-China Dispute (4 Mar. 
2010), (news.techworld.com/networking/3214222/us-may-use-wto-to-
resolve-google-china-dispute) (stating that the Obama Administration is 
reportedly considering using the World Trade Organisation to help Google 
in its censorship battle with China). 
19 China, White Paper on the Internet in China (8 June 2010), 
(www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/2010-
06/08/content_20207975.htm). 
20 Huang Huikang, Statement at Budapest Conference on Cyber Issues (4 Oct. 
2012), (www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/zgbd/t977627.htm). 
21 Ma Xinmin, What Kind of Cyberspace We Need?, 3 
Contemporary International Relations (2015), 102–107. In early 2017, the 
aim to “enhance international rule of law in cyberspace” was named as one 
of China’s strategic goals. See International Strategy of Cooperation on 
Cyberspace. Xinhuanet (1 Mar. 2017), 
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
03/01/c_136094371.htm). 




cyberspace governance has been achieved. An early indication of this 
consensus came in the form of a “landmark”22 report of the United Nations 
(UN) Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) adopted in June 2013.23 The 
report, agreed to by representatives of fifteen cyber-active nations selected on 
the basis of equitable geographic distribution, confirmed that “[i]nternational 
law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and is 
essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, 
peaceful and accessible ICT [information and communication technology] 
environment”.24 In another consensus report adopted by the UN GGE (albeit 
one of slightly differently composition) in July 2015, further progress was 
achieved as to how international norms, rules and principles apply to State-
conducted ICT-related activities. 25  The consensus of the UN GGE was 
widely acknowledged within and outside the UN at, inter alia, the Seoul 
Conference on Cyberspace 201326 and at the Antalya Summit of G20 Leaders 
in 2015.27  
 12. Therefore, the premise that international rule of law is 
indispensable for the future order of cyberspace has now become universally 
accepted. For instance, during President Xi Jinping’s State visit to the US in 
September 2015, China and the US issued a statement to the effect that: 
 
Both sides are committed to making common effort to further identify 
and promote appropriate norms of state behavior in cyberspace within 
the international community. The United States and China welcome the 
July 2015 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts in the Field 
                                                        
22 United States, Department of State, Statement on Consensus Achieved by 
the UN Group of Governmental Experts On Cyber Issues (7 June 2013), 
(www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210418.htm). 
23 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, UN Doc. A/68/98, 24 June 2013 (hereinafter “UN 
GGE 2013”). 
24 Ibid., para.19. 
25 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the 
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, UN Doc. A/70/174, 22 July 2015 (hereinafter “UN 
GGE 2015”). 
26 Seoul Framework for and Commitment to Open and Secure Cyberspace, 
(www.mofat.go.kr/english/visa/images/res/SeoulFramework.pdf). 
27 G20 Leaders’ Communiqué at Antalya Summit, 
(www.cfr.org/economics/g20-leaders-communique-antalya-
summit/p37362). 
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of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International 
security, which addresses norms of behavior and other crucial issues for 
international security in cyberspace.28 
 
13. It is true that States have different interests and divergent perceptions of 
the international order in cyberspace. Yet, their readiness to embrace the rule 
of law in cyberspace can be seen as a rational choice based on their common 
interest and inter-dependence in cyberspace. As Malcolm Shaw put it, “[i]n 
the long march of mankind from the cave to the computer a central role has 
always been played by the idea of law—the idea that order is necessary and 
chaos inimical to a just and stable existence”.29 Here, just as on the high seas, 
in the airspace, in the outer space and in other international domains, the rule 
of law offers stability and predictability which allows members of the 
international community, including China and Western countries, to pursue 
their common interests while accommodating their differences. This is all the 
more so due to the fact that both sides share a similar mix of strengths and 
vulnerabilities, very well expressed by a high-ranking Chinese military officer 
at a meeting with US representatives in this vivid metaphor: “The United 
States has big stones in its hands but also has a plate-glass window. China has 
big stones in its hands but also a plate-glass window. Perhaps because of this, 
there are things we can agree on”.30  
 
 
III. Identification and development of international cyberspace law 
 
14. While a general consensus may be and—it is submitted—has been reached 
in the international community on the level of general principles, States 
remain divided on many key issues regarding the rule of law in cyberspace. 
The reasons for these divergences are varied. They include mankind’s limited 
knowledge and practice regarding cyberspace and different, sometimes even 
opposing, ideologies, values and national interests. Compared to most other 
fields of international law, the rule of law in cyberspace is still in a nascent 
stage.  
 15. The first area where Western and Chinese views appear to diverge 
relates to the preferred method of development and interpretation of 
                                                        
28 The White House, FACT SHEET: President Xi Jinping’s State Visit to the 
United States, (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/fact-
sheet-president-xi-jinpings-state-visit-united-states). 
29 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th edn., 2014), 1. 
30 Joseph Menn, Agreement on cybersecurity “badly needed”, Financial Times 
(12 Oct. 2011), (www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e595e568-f4dc-11e0-ba2d-
00144feab49a.html). 




international legal rules for State conduct in cyberspace. This issue is closely 
related to the preferred mode of Internet governance, discussed later in this 
article.31 In principle, the key difference relates to the question whether there 
is a need for new rules of international law governing cyber operations or 
whether the existing body of law is satisfactory. 
 16. On the one hand, the US has argued that the existing international 
law framework is adequate. In its view, the novel nature of cyber operations 
may necessitate the reinterpretation of some of the applicable rules, but by 
and large, the pre-Internet rules should suffice for the online era. This was 
clearly outlined already in the White House’s 2011 International Strategy for 
Cyberspace: 
 
The development of norms for state conduct in cyberspace does not 
require a reinvention of customary international law, nor does it render 
existing international norms obsolete. Long-standing international norms 
guiding state behavior—in times of peace and conflict—also apply in 
cyberspace.32 
 
 17. US endorsement of the existing legal framework implied two logical 
consequences. First, it translated into an invitation—or even soft pressure—
for other States to issue similar acknowledgments. That they would do so had 
not always been foreordained. In the mid-1990s, Internet activists were 
attempting to keep cyberspace free of any government regulation, whether 
pre-existing or new, an approach epitomised by John Perry Barlow’s 1996 
Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.33 Twenty years later, the document, 
which describes governments as “weary giants of flesh and steel” and their 
                                                        
31 See section IV below. 
32 US International Strategy, above n.16, 9. This appears to have remained the 
US view until the present day. In his speech delivered at Berkeley Law 
School on 10 Nov. 2016, Brian J. Egan, Legal Adviser of the US 
Department of State, reiterated that “[e]xisting principles of international 
law form a cornerstone of the United States’ strategic framework of 
international cyber stability during peacetime and during armed conflict”. 
See Brian J. Egan, International Law and Stability in Cyberspace 
(www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-
International-Law-and-Stability-in-Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf), 2. 
No change in this respect has been discernible between the inauguration of 
President Donald Trump in Jan. 2017 and the completion of this article in 
May 2017. 
33 John P. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1995), 
(projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html). 
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laws as “hostile and colonial measures”,34 may sound oddly antiquated. But at 
that time it was conceivable (and seriously argued) that the rules designed for 
the “offline world” would not, and should not, reach into cyberspace.35  
 18. Nonetheless, calls for cyberspace as a sovereignty-free zone 
remained fantasies. Gradually, other States from all geographical regions 
issued statements affirming that they too considered international law 
applicable to conduct in cyberspace.36 This viewpoint was cemented in the 
2013 UN GGE report mentioned above,37 which was later endorsed by a 
resolution of the UN General Assembly.38 Therefore, today the international 
community shares the originally predominantly US position that international 
law is applicable to the cyber domain.  
 19. Secondly, acceptance that international law applies in general begs 
the question of how precisely it does so in specific circumstances. In other 
words, the US position implies the need for States to interpret the existing 
rules in the context of novel situations that arise in connection with States’ 
and other actors’ conduct in cyberspace.  
 20. This is equally relevant to both principal sources of international 
law. With respect to treaties, the agreement of State parties to a treaty on a 
specific interpretation of a provision is considered “authentic interpretation”39 
or “authoritative interpretation”40 and carries greater weight in the interpretive 
process, a point that is confirmed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.41 Interpretation of customary rules by States may likewise contribute 
                                                        
34 Ibid. 
35 See, e.g., David R. Johnson and David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of 
Law in Cyberspace, 48 Stanford LR (1996), 1367. 
36 See, e.g., UN Doc A/65/154 (2010), 15 (United Kingdom); UN Doc 
A/68/156/Add.1, 4 (Canada); ibid., 12 (Iran); ibid., 15 (Japan); ibid., 16–17 
(Netherlands); UN Doc A/66/152 (2011), 6 (Australia); ibid., 18 (US); UN 
Doc A/68/156 (2013), 18 (United Kingdom); UN Doc A/69/112 (2014), 
16 (Switzerland). 
37 UN GGE 2013, above n.23, para.19. 
38 GA Res 68/243 (9 Jan. 2014), preambular para.18. 
39 ILC, Summary record of the 765th meeting, UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.765 
(1964), 277 para.34 (Ruda) (“as between States the only legally valid 
interpretation of a treaty was the authentic interpretation by the parties to the 
treaty”) (emphasis added). 
40 Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian frontier (question of 
Jaworzina), advisory opinion, PCIJ Reports, Series B, No. 8 (1923), 37 (“it is 
an established principle that the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of 
a legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify 
or suppress it”) (emphasis added). 
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), 1155 UNTS 331, art. 
31(3)(a) (requiring to take into account, together with the context, “any 




towards the clarification of their content or development, as the line between 
interpretation and creation of customary international law is notoriously 
indistinct.42 Therefore, whatever the source in question, official statements of 
States concerning existing rules of international law are of crucial importance. 
Regrettably, such statements have been infrequent in the area of cyber 
security.43 
 21. On the other hand, the Chinese position on this issue differs in 
crucial aspects from that of the US. Although China, as one of the States 
continuously represented in the UN GGE, accepts the general applicability of 
international law to cyberspace, it differs substantially with regard to the need 
for new rules. Its representatives emphasize that novel “unique problems 
without ready solutions” emerge from cyberspace and “it is necessary to 
formulate new legal rules to solve them”.44 This approach is also reflected in 
the new Chinese 2016–2020 five-year plan, which for the first time expressly 
suggests that China should “[a]ctively participate in the making of 
international rules on the Internet”. 45  In support of this view, Chinese 
                                                                                                                                
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions”). 
42 Cf. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, 174, 190 (ind. op. Alvarez) (“[I]n 
many cases it is quite impossible to say where the development of law ends 
and where its creation begins”). 
43 See further Michael N. Schmitt and Sean Watts, The Decline of 
International Humanitarian Law Opinio Juris and the Law of Cyber 
Warfare, 50 Texas ILJ (2015), 189 (on State silence concerning IHL and 
cyberspace); Kubo Mačák, From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging 
States as Law-makers, 30 Leiden JIL (2017) (forthcoming) (on States’ 
general reluctance to engage in international law-making in the area of cyber 
security). For two notable exceptions to this trend, see Harold H. Koh, 
International Law in Cyberspace, 54 Harvard ILJ Online (2012), 1 (outlining 
the US position on a number of issues concerning the application of 
international law to cyber operations); Egan, above n.32, 8–22 (outlining the 
US views on how certain rules of international law apply to States’ 
behaviour in cyberspace). 
44 Ma Xinmin, Letter to the Editors: What Kind of Internet Order Do We 
Need?, 14 Chinese JIL (2015), 399, 401. 
45 Goals, missions of China’s new five-year plan, Xinhuanet (5 Mar. 2016), 
(news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/05/c_135158252.htm). See also 
International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace. Xinhuanet (1 Mar. 
2017), (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
03/01/c_136094371.htm) (“China supports formulating universally 
accepted international rules and norms of state behavior in cyberspace”). 
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representatives have repeatedly invoked the metaphor of cyberspace as a road 
system with heavy traffic, but no comprehensive “traffic rules”.46  
 22. The first significant attempt to draw up such “traffic rules” with 
global reach is the joint Sino-Russian proposal for an International Code of 
Conduct for Information Security.47 This document was drafted in the form of a 
proposed UN General Assembly resolution and contains thirteen numbered 
“pledges”, with content varying from the reaffirmation of existing 
international legal rules 48  to the taking a stand on contested issues like 
Internet governance. 49  In addition to Russia and China, the initiative is 
presently supported by the other members of the Shanghai Co-operation 
                                                        
46 See, e.g., China, Speech by H.E. Ambassador Wang Qun at the First 
Committee of the 66th Session of the GA on Information and Cyberspace 
Security (20 Nov. 2011), 
(www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t869580.shtml) 
(“In this information age, information ‘highway’ has reached almost all 
corners of our planet. It is worrisome, however, that in this virtual space 
where traffic is very heavy, there is, hitherto, no comprehensive ‘traffic 
rules’. As a result, ‘traffic accidents’ in information and cyber space 
constantly occur with ever increasing damage and impact.”); Shen Jian, An 
International Code of Conduct for Information Security: China’s 
perspective on building a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace 
(Geneva, 10 Feb. 2014), (www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/a-cyber-
code-of-conduct-the-best-vehicle-for-progress-en-1-963.pdf) (“Nowadays, 
the information ‘highway’ has reached almost every corner in the world. It is 
of great concern, however, that in this virtual space where traffic is very 
heavy, there is still no comprehensive ‘traffic rules’. As a result, ‘traffic 
accidents’ in information and cyber space constantly occur with ever 
increasing damage and impact.”). 
47 Letter dated 12 Sept. 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, 
the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc A/66/359, 14 Sept. 2011, 3–5 
(hereinafter “Code of Conduct 2011”); Letter dated 9 Jan. 2015 from the 
Permanent Representatives of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to 
the Secretary-General, UN Doc 69/723, 13 Jan. 2015, 3–6 (hereinafter 
“Code of Conduct 2015”). 
48 See, e.g., Code of Conduct 2015, above n.47, para.1 (mandating compliance 
with the UN Charter and other “universally recognized norms governing 
international relations”). 
49 Ibid., para.8 (“All States must play the same role in, and carry equal 
responsibility for, international governance of the Internet […] in a way 
which promotes the establishment of multilateral, transparent and 
democratic international Internet governance mechanisms”). 




Organization (SCO)—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.50 
 23. China also has demonstrated its preference for the development of 
new legal norms in its regional and bilateral norm-making initiatives. The 
Code of Conduct itself reflects many concepts contained in the SCO’s 
binding 2009 Information Security Agreement (Yekaterinburg Agreement).51 
Further, in 2015, China entered into a bilateral agreement with Russia aimed 
at the enhancement of co-operation between the two countries on 
information security issues. 52  Both of these agreements contain specific 
binding commitments to co-operate in ensuring “international information 
security” in multiple areas.53 Together, these initiatives confirm China’s desire 
to expand its role in global governance on the basis of a conviction that it 
should transform itself from a “rule taker” to a “rule maker”.54  
 24. What remains to be seen is, despite the potential flaws of the “law-
by-analogy approach” of applying existing law in cyberspace,55 whether other 
States will accept the need for the development of new international legal 
norms for the cyber domain. For now, the probability of other States joining 
                                                        
50 Code of Conduct 2015, above n.47, 1. 
51 Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Cooperation in the Field of 
International Information Security (signed 16 June 2009, entered into force 
5 Jan. 2012) (hereinafter “Yekaterinburg Agreement”). 
52 Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the 
Government of the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation to Ensure 
International Information Security [Соглашение между Правительством 
Российской Федерацией и Правительством Китайской Народной Республики о 
сотрудничестве в области обеспечения международной информационной 
безопасности] (signed 8 May 2015), 
(government.ru/media/files/5AMAccs7mSlXgbff1Ua785WwMWcABDJw.
pdf) (in Russian) (hereinafter “Russia-China Agreement”). On 25 June 2016, 
the presidents of the two countries signed a further joint declaration on 
promoting the development of information and cyber space. See Xinhua 
News Agency, China, Russia sign joint statement on strengthening global 
strategic stability, (news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
06/26/c_135466187.htm). 
53 See, e.g., Yekaterinburg Agreement, above n.51, art. 3; Russia-China 
Agreement, above n.52, art. 3. 
54 See further Scott Kennedy and Shuaihua Cheng (eds.), From Rule Takers to 
Rule Makers: The Growing Role of Chinese in Global Governance (2012). 
55 See Duncan Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A 
Duty to Hack?, in: Jens David Ohlin et al. (eds.), Cyberwar: Law and Ethics 
for Virtual Conflicts (2015), 148–155 (discussing the inaccuracies, 
ineffectiveness and incompleteness of the law-by-analogy approach). 
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the Yekaterinburg Agreement is low, although this might change following 
the expected accession of India and Pakistan to the SCO in June 2017.56 
Similarly, the Sino-Russian Code of Conduct has achieved little traction 
beyond the six sponsoring States. Western States in particular have been said 
to view the initiative with suspicion and as “aimed at establishing a strict 
national sovereignty model over content flow over the Internet and 
potentially a tool of oppressive regimes”.57 Moreover, it has been suggested 
that even China may be sceptical with respect to multilateral binding 
commitments of this kind out of concern that “Russia would play the spoiler 
in any multilateral negotiation”.58 
 25. Nevertheless, identification of norms through the UN GGE 
process is a strong indication of a convergence between the two “camps”. As 
was mentioned, in 2013 the UN GGE adopted a “landmark consensus”59 on 
the applicability of international law in cyberspace.60 While the actual import 
of the consensus is controversial, as it was expressed in the form of a non-
binding report, such non-binding documents may effectively lead to binding 
rules over time.61 Also, the symbolic value of the GGE as a norm-making 
process should not be underestimated. Composed of representatives of 15 
UN member states, including the three “cyber superpowers” (China, Russia, 
and the United States), the GGE’s position can be taken as confirming a 
shared understanding in the international community. 62  In 2015, the 
                                                        
56 See India, Pakistan edge closer to joining SCO security bloc, The Express 
Tribune (24 June 2016), (tribune.com.pk/story/1129533/india-pakistan-
edge-closer-joining-sco-security-bloc); Liu Caiyu, India, Pakistan to become 
full SCO members, Global Times (9 Mar. 2017), 
(http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1036971.shtml). 
57 Theresa Hitchens, Cybersecurity: Global Responses to a Global Challenge 
(21 Mar. 2014), (textlab.io/doc/953515/madrid--21-march-2014). 
58 Scott Warren Harold, Martin C. Libicki and Astrid Stuth Cevallos, Getting 
to Yes With China in Cyberspace (2015), 64 (attributing this view to an 
unnamed high-level Chinese respondent). 
59 United States, Department of State, Statement on Consensus Achieved by 
the UN Group of Governmental Experts On Cyber Issues (7 June 2013), 
(www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/210418.htm). 
60 UN GGE 2013, above n.23. 
61  See further Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International 
Law (2007), 211–229 (exploring the significance of soft law for international 
law-making in general); Mačák, above n.43, section 5.1 (examining the 
consolidation of non-binding norms into binding rules in the legal regimes 
for Antarctica and nuclear safety, from the perspective of the emerging 
body of international cyber security law). 
62 The UN General Assembly subsequently “[w]elcom[ed]” the GGE report in 
a unanimously adopted resolution without, however, discussing the details 




reconstituted UN GGE adopted a new consensus document, which proposed 
11 voluntary, non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible State 
behaviour, as well as six views on how international law applies to the use of 
ICTs by States.63 The unique role played by the UN GGE as a norm-making 
process was again confirmed by the acknowledgement it received at the G20 
summit in 2015, 64  the G7 summit in 2016, 65  and a number of other 
international forums. Additionally, a new GGE was established again by the 
UN Secretary-General in 2016 and is expected to report to the UN General 
Assembly in 2017.66 
 26. The norms, rules and principles adopted by the UN GGE thus far 
largely reflect the extent of the current compromise between Western 
countries and emerging economies, including China. To be sure, China has 
contributed significantly to the GGE process. This can be seen, inter alia, 
from the GGE’s emphasis on sovereignty and other principles enshrined in 
the UN Charter 67 ; and the attention it paid to the unique attributes of 
cyberspace and the resulting need for developing additional norms beyond 
                                                                                                                                
of its contents. See GA Res 68/243 (9 Jan. 2014), preambular para.11. In 
2014/15, the membership of the GGE expanded to 20 States and 
subsequently to the current number of 25 participating States. 
63 UN GGE 2015, above n.25. Among others, the norms, rules or principles 
of responsible behaviour of States provide that states should not knowingly 
allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; 
states, in ensuring the secure use of ICTs, should guarantee full respect for 
human rights, including the right to freedom of expression; a state should 
not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations 
under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure. The 
6 views on the application of international law suggest that states have 
jurisdiction over the ICT infrastructure located within their territory; states 
may exercise the inherent right to take measures consistent with 
international law and as recognized in the Charter; states must not use 
proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should seek 
to ensure that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit such 
acts; states must meet their international obligations regarding 
internationally wrongful acts attributable to them under international law. 
64 G20 Leaders’ Communiqué at Antalya Summit, see above n.27. 
65 G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration (G7 Ise-Shima Summit, 26–27 May 
2016), (www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/27/g7-ise-shima-
leaders-declaration). 
66 GA Res 70/237 (30 Dec. 2015), para.5. 
67 UN GGE 2013, above n.23, paras.19–20; UN GGE 2015, above n.25, 
para.25. 
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existing international law.68 In the meantime, China’s acceptance of norms, 
rules, and principles advocated by Western countries, including the rules on 
state responsibility,69 and the reference to due diligence,70 also serves as a 
strong signal that countries with different interests and values can work 
together to pursue effective cooperation. 
 27. Ongoing bilateral negotiations transcending the usual East-West 
divide also suggest that more progress might be made in the future. For 
instance, in June 2015, the US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that 
the US and China “agreed that we must work together to complete a code of 
conduct regarding cyber activities”.71 A few months later, the two countries 
reportedly held talks to discuss a bilateral cyber arms control treaty.72 Other 
Western States have concluded non-binding political agreements on 
cybersecurity with China since then. 73  These developments may gradually 
pave the way towards the adoption of legally binding cyber treaties,74 thus 
                                                        
68 UN GGE 2013, above n.23, para.16 (“Given the unique attributes of ICTs, 
additional norms could be developed over time”); UN GGE 2015, above 
n.25, para.15. 
69 UN GGE 2013, above n.23, para.23 (“States must meet their international 
obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable to them. 
States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts. States 
should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors 
for unlawful use of ICTs.”); UN GGE 2015, above n.25, para.13 (“States 
should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally 
wrongful acts using ICTs”). 
70 UN GGE 2015, above n.25, para.28 (“States must not use proxies to 
commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should seek to ensure 
that their territory is not used by non-State actors to commit such acts”).  
71 US, John Kerry, The Strategic & Economic Dialogue / Consultation on 
People-to-People Exchange: Closing Statements, (24 June 2015), 
(www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/244208.htm). 
72 David E. Sanger, U.S. and China Seek Arms Deal for Cyberspace, New 
York Times, (19 Sept. 2015), 
(www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/world/asia/us-and-china-seek-arms-deal-
for-cyberspace.html?_r=0). 
73 See, e.g., UK, UK-China Joint Statement 2015 (22 Oct. 2015), 
(www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-china-joint-statement-2015) 
(agreement not to conduct or support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual 
property); China, Germany agree deeper cooperation, Xinhuanet (29 Oct. 
2015), (news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/29/c_134763586.htm) 
(agreement to launch bilateral consultations on cyber affairs). 
74  Cf. Dinah Shelton, International Law and “Relative Normativity”, in: 
Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (4th edn., 2014), 162 (“process 
of negotiating and drafting non-binding instruments can greatly facilitate the 




continuing to bring the two camps closer together.75 
 
 
IV. Internet governance and international law 
 
28. A closely connected potential area of divergence concerns the preferred 
method of Internet governance (also referred to as “cyberspace governance”). 
While in the previous section we focussed on debates about the need for new 
norms and their claim to authority under the existing legal frameworks, we 
now turn to the related question of the preferred frameworks and processes 
of governance.  
 29. Historically, the Internet has evolved in a diffuse and decentralized 
way. Military researchers in the US laid the network’s fundaments in the 
1960s. Since then it has grown organically as universities, research institutions, 
and private entities from around the world have gradually joined in. 
Throughout this period, the governance of the growing network, and matters 
related to its governance, have evolved in an equally haphazard, organic, and 
decentralized manner. This is the main reason why today the process of 
cyberspace governance consists of a technical ecosystem of thousands of 
“stakeholders” dispersed globally.  
 30. Originally, the role of States in Internet governance was very 
limited. As late as 1992, David Clark, a computer science professor at MIT, 
expressed the ethos of the prevailing government-free governance model in a 
memorable phrase: “We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: 
rough consensus and running code.” 76  Nonetheless, States have gradually 
inched their way into governance. Governments now belong among the 
relevant “stakeholders”, in addition to civil society organizations, semi-public 
standards organizations, network operators, Internet service providers, 
individuals, and other actors.  
 31. Two bodies stand out in this complex web of relationships. The 
first is the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), a private entity based in the US. ICANN manages the global 
Domain Name System, which is a vast distributed database that translates 
domain names (such as chinesejil.oxfordjournals.org) to their corresponding 
IP addresses (such as 209.135.222.209). In this way, the DNS—sometimes 
referred to as the Internet’s phone book—enables the users to communicate 
                                                                                                                                
achievement of the consensus necessary to produce a binding multilateral 
agreement”). 
75  Mačák, above n.43, section 5.3. 
76 David D. Clark, A Cloudy Crystal Ball: Visions of the Future (IETF, July 
1992), (groups.csail.mit.edu/ana/People/DDC/future_ietf_92.pdf). 
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and as such is a key component of the functionality of the Internet. ICANN 
had been under the oversight of the US Department of Commerce for nearly 
two decades since its establishment in 1998. In June 2016, the US agreed to 
relinquish control over ICANN and pass it to the global Internet 
community. 77  The transition officially took place on 1 October 2016, 78 
following the rejection by a US federal court of a request for injunction 
brought by several US states that sought to prolong US oversight.79 
 32. The second key entity is the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a 
platform for the representatives of States, private industry, civil society, and 
intergovernmental organizations to discuss public policy issues relating to the 
Internet. Although it lacks formal decision-making powers (or even members 
stricto sensu), the IGF allows participating stakeholders to discuss their views 
on contentious matters and share best practices. Created in 2006 at the UN-
sponsored World Summit on the Information Society in Geneva,80 the IGF 
retains a close link with the UN. 81  In December 2015, the UN General 
Assembly acknowledged the role of the IGF as “a multi-stakeholder platform 
for discussion of Internet governance issues” and decided to extend its 
mandate for another ten years.82 
 33. This governance model is best described as “multi-stakeholder” due 
to its inclusion of a plethora of non-State actors alongside governments. In 
other words, the status quo is “organic, open, yet non-representative”.83 Most 
Western countries endorse this approach to cyber governance. For example, 
the US co-ordinator for cyber issues, Christopher Painter, stated in 2013 that 
                                                        
77 US, Letter to ICANN Chairman Crocker Transmitting Assessment of 
IANA Transition Proposal (9 June 2016) 
(www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/crocker_transmittal_letter_2016
0609.pdf).  
78 ICANN, Stewardship of IANA Functions Transitions to Global Internet 
Community as Contract with U.S. Government Ends (1 Oct. 2016), 
(www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-10-01-en). 
79 US, District Court-Southern District of Texas, State of Arizona et al v. 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) et 
al, Civil Action No 3:16-CV-274, Order (3 Oct. 2016), 
(domainnamewire.com/wp-content/hanks-iana.pdf) (confirming the order 
made orally on 30 Sept. 2016, which had denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a 
temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction). 
80 GA Res 60/252 (27 Mar. 2006), para.9. 
81 See further IGF, About the IGF (undated), 
(www.intgovforum.org/cms/aboutigf). The IGF formally belongs under the 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). 
82 GA Res 70/125 (16 Dec. 2015), para.63. 
83 Peter W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What 
Everyone Needs to Know (2014), 29. 




the US “is committed […] to a multistakeholder model that gives all 
appropriate stakeholders in the Internet the ability to participate in its 
evolution”. 84  Similarly, clear statements have recently been issued by 
representatives of various other Western countries, including the United 
Kingdom,85 Germany,86 and Canada,87 as well as by the European Union.88 
 34. In contrast, China has expressly endorsed the competing 
“multilateral” conception of cyberspace governance. As Lu Wei, the head of 
the Cyberspace Administration of China, succinctly put it in 2014, “with 
regard to the cyberspace governance, the U.S. advocates ‘multi-stakeholders’ 
while China believes in ‘multilateral’”.89 Domestically, the same goal occupied 
a prominent place in the new five-year plan for 2016–2020, which called on 
China to “[p]ush forward the establishment of a multilateral, democratic and 
transparent international Internet governance system”.90  
                                                        
84 US, Statement for the Record by Christopher Painter, Coordinator for 
Cyber Issues, Cyber Attacks: An Unprecedented Threat to U.S. National 
Security (21 Mar. 2013), 
(docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20130321/100547/HHRG-113-
FA14-Wstate-PainterC-20130321.pdf), 2. 
85 UK, Sajid Javid’s [then Cultural Secretary] speech at the CyFy 2014 
Conference, India (16 Oct. 2014), 
(www.gov.uk/government/speeches/sajid-javids-speech-at-the-cyfy-2014-
conference-india) (“Internet governance should be built on a fully inclusive, 
multi-stakeholder process.”). 
86 Federal Republic of Germany, Statement of Dr. Norbert Riedel, 
Ambassador, Commissioner for International Cyber Policy (22 Oct. 2014), 
(www.itu.int/en/plenipotentiary/2014/statements/file/Pages/germany.asp
x) (“For further developing internet governance, Germany will […] stick to 
the multi-stakeholder model[.]”). 
87 Canada, Address by Minister Baird on Importance of Internet Freedom and 
Governance (25 Nov. 2014), (news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=909199) 
(“I like plain speaking, so let’s be honest: ‘multi-stakeholder Internet 
governance’ is not the snappiest or sexiest phrase. But it’s exactly what we 
need to preserve, if we are going to ensure that the Internet remains 
innovative, free and open to benefit all users.”). 
88 EU Cybersecurity Strategy, above n.17, 4 (“The EU reaffirms the 
importance of all stakeholders in the current Internet governance model and 
supports this multi-stakeholder governance approach[.]”). 
89 Lu Wei, Cyber Sovereignty Must Rule Global Internet, World Post (15 Dec. 
2014), (www.huffingtonpost.com/lu-wei/china-cyber-
sovereignty_b_6324060.html). 
90 Goals, missions of China's new five-year plan, Xinhuanet (5 Mar. 2016), 
(news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-03/05/c_135158252.htm) (emphasis 
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 35. From the Chinese perspective, the existing multi-stakeholder 
platforms are “fragmented and divided with limited function and 
authorization, and confined to specific areas, regions or interests”, with the 
overall framework lacking in “design and coordination”. 91  Instead, China 
prefers the multilateral model, which is top-down, State-centric, and co-
ordinated in nature. As it ascribes a decisive role to national governments,92 
the primary forum for this governance model is, quite logically, the UN.93 
 36. It is in the UN context that the moment of greatest discord on 
matters of cyberspace governance arguably occurred. In 2012, countries led 
by Russia and China made an important push for the multilateral approach at 
a conference of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in Dubai, 
in the context of the revision of the International Telecommunication 
Regulations (ITRs). These States submitted several proposals aimed at the 
strengthening of the position of governments in Internet governance.94 Some 
                                                                                                                                
added); see also International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace. 
Xinhuanet (1 Mar. 2017), (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
03/01/c_136094371.htm) (“International cyberspace governance should 
follow a multilateral approach.”). 
91 Ma Xinmin, above n.44, 400. 
92 See Shen Jian, An International Code of Conduct for Information Security: 
China’s Perspective on Building a Peaceful, Secure, Open and Cooperative 
Cyberspace (Geneva, 10 Feb. 2014), 
(www.unidir.ch/files/conferences/pdfs/a-cyber-code-of-conduct-the-best-
vehicle-for-progress-en-1-963.pdf) (“we should give full play to the leading 
role of the governments”). 
93 White Paper on the Internet in China, above n.19, section VI (“China holds 
that the role of the UN should be given full scope in international Internet 
administration.”); International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace. 
Xinhuanet (1 Mar. 2017), (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
03/01/c_136094371.htm) (“The United Nations, as an important channel, 
should play a leading role in coordinating positions of various parties and 
building international consensus.”). See also Jon R. Lindsay and Derek S. 
Reveron, Conclusion: The Rise of China and the Future of Cybersecurity, 
in: Jon R. Lindsay, Tai Ming Cheung and Derek S. Reveron (eds.), China 
and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain 
(2015), 346; Nigel Inkster, above n.14, 147. 
94 See, e.g., ITU, WCIT-12, Proposals Received from ITU Member States for 
the Work of the Conference, Doc DT/1-E (30 Nov. 2012), 
(www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000188223.pdf), 98–99 (proposed Article 
3A); ITU, WCIT-12, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, China, United Arab 
Emirates, Russian Federation, Iraq, Sudan: Proposals for the Work of the 
Conference, Doc 47-E (11 Dec. 2012), (files.wcitleaks.org/public/S12-
WCIT12-C-0047!!MSW-E.pdf), 7–8 (endorsing and expanding the Russian 




of the language from the proposals was eventually included in a non-binding 
resolution 95  adopted amidst much controversy on the final day of the 
conference.96 Although the ITU Secretary General later emphasised that the 
revised ITRs did not even mention the Internet,97 the “negotiating schism” at 
the conference 98  resulted in the refusal of more than a third of the 
participating countries (including virtually all Western countries) to sign the 
amended treaty.99 
 37. Whilst the developments in Dubai cemented China and Russia as 
allies on matters of cyber governance, it should be noted that the two 
countries’ positions are not identical.100 It is true that both China and Russia 
generally support the multilateral model. For instance, they presented a united 
front at the UN’s World Summit on Information Society in 2015, pushing for 
the inclusion of the term “multilateral” in the event’s outcome document.101 
This effort was ultimately successful and the outcome document was 
modified to include compromise wording to the effect that “the management 
of the Internet as a global facility includes multilateral, transparent, democratic 
and multi-stakeholder processes”.102  
                                                                                                                                
proposal). 
95 ITU, WCIT-12, Final Acts of the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (2012), (www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/documents/final-
acts-wcit-12.pdf), 20 (Resolution PLEN/3). 
96 See, e.g., Richard Hill, The New International Telecommunication 
Regulations and the Internet: A Commentary and Legislative History (2014), 
60–63. 
97 Monika Ermert and Jimm Phillips, 89 Nations Sign Revised ITRs at WCIT, 
55 Opposed or “May Sign Later”, Communications Daily (17 Dec. 2012), 
(reporting that the ITU Secretary-General Hamadoun Touré said that “[t]he 
treaty text does not include the Internet, it does not include content”).  
98 David Fidler, Internet Governance and International Law: The Controversy 
Concerning Revision of the International Telecommunication Regulations, 
17(6) ASIL Insights (2013), 1, 2. 
99 ITU, WCIT 2012: Signatories of the Final Acts (14 Dec. 2012), 
(www.itu.int/osg/wcit-12/highlights/signatories.html). 
100 But see, e.g., Inkster, above n.14, 10 (describing Russia and China as leaders 
of the “camp [of] authoritarian states” on matters of cyber security and 
Internet governance). 
101 Dan Levin, At U.N., China Tries to Influence Fight Over Internet Control, 
The New York Times (16 Dec. 2015), 
(www.nytimes.com/2015/12/17/technology/china-wins-battle-with-un-
over-word-in-internet-control-document.html?_r=2). 
102 UN GA, Outcome document of the high-level meeting of the General 
Assembly on the overall review of the implementation of the outcomes of 
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 38. However, China’s position is more moderate than that espoused by 
Russia. This could be seen in the landmark NETmundial meeting held in 
Brazil in 2014, at the end of which a non-binding Multistakeholder Statement was 
agreed to by participants ranging from governments and industry to civil 
society and academia. 103  The document stated that “Internet governance 
should be built on democratic, multistakeholder processes”.104 As such, it was 
repudiated by the Russian representative in an unusual strongly worded 
statement delivered during the event’s closing session.105 Conversely, China 
agreed to the document, likely to demonstrate its willingness to reach a 
compromise solution in view of its long-term goals. These goals may have 
included the building of a broader coalition of States in order to gradually 
disrupt the US monopoly over the control of Internet resources and its 
aforementioned control of ICANN.106 
 39. Therefore, there certainly seems to be space for future convergence 
between the extreme poles of multi-stakeholderism and multilateralism. As we 
have seen, even the supposed proponents of these archetypal positions are 
not doctrinal purists in the sense of rejecting every aspect of the alternative 
view. In fact, various modalities of combination and/or alignment of the two 
positions are imaginable. To some extent, they may already be emerging now.  
 40. Importantly, representatives of both supposed opposing camps 
have sowed the seeds of convergence. In the same article in which he 
contrasted China’s multilateral model with the US multi-stakeholder approach 
(discussed above), Lu Wei noted that the “two alternatives are not intrinsically 
contradictory. […] Without ‘multilateral,’ there would be no ‘multi-
stakeholders’.”107 In a similar vein, Ma Xinmin, a senior Chinese diplomat and 
international lawyer, recently proposed “the option of establishing a special 
                                                                                                                                
the World Summit on the Information Society, UN Doc A/70/L.33 (13 
Dec. 2015), para. 57 (emphases added). 
103 NETmundial, NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement (24 Apr. 2014), 
(netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-
Multistakeholder-Document.pdf). 
104 Ibid., 6 (emphasis added). 
105 NETmundial, NETmundial Closing Session (24 Apr. 2014), 
(netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETMundial-23April2014-
Closing-Session-en.pdf), 21–22. 
106 Cf. Zhong Sheng, Norms and Standards are Key in Internet Governance, 
Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (28 Apr. 2014), 
(opinion.people.com.cn/n/2014/0428/c1003-24947988.html) (describing 
the transition of ICANN’s functions as a “positive signal for global Internet 
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107 Lu Wei, Cyber Sovereignty Must Rule Global Internet, World Post (15 Dec. 
2014), (www.huffingtonpost.com/lu-wei/china-cyber-
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committee on Internet governance under the UN General Assembly, which 
will take into account interests of multi-stakeholders […] so as to build a 
harmonious, rule-based order for cyberspace”.108  
 41. US representatives have also recently made conciliatory remarks. 
For instance, Julie Zoller, the US State Department official responsible for 
communications and information policy relative to multilateral organizations, 
publicly extolled the IGF’s potential to bring the two camps together:  
 
The connection to the United Nations provides the IGF legitimacy in the 
eyes of many participants from the developing world, and the 
multistakeholder nature of the IGF gives it the expertise and vibrancy to 
address the critical issues of the day.109  
 
 42. Additionally, the UN GGE appears to be taking “interests of multi-
stakeholders” into account. It is true that neither of its consensus documents, 
adopted in 2013 and 2015 respectively, made direct reference to the term 
“multi-stakeholders”. Yet, on a number of occasions, the role of the private 
sector and civil society organizations was cited. For example, the 2015 
document emphasized that:  
 
While States have a primary responsibility for maintaining a secure and 
peaceful ICT environment, effective international cooperation would 
benefit from identifying mechanisms for the participation, as appropriate, 
of the private sector, academia and civil society organizations.110 
 
 43. What these statements share is a willingness to bring the seemingly 
irreconcilable positions together. Rather than forcing a choice between the 
two options,111 which seems exceedingly unlikely to be accepted by the key 
players, it may be more productive to allow the different understandings to 
coexist and continue the dialogue between the parties in order to enable the 
                                                        
108 Ma Xinmin, above n.44, 400. 
109 US, Julie Zoller, Advancing the Multistakeholder Approach in the 
Multilateral Context (16 July 2015), 
(www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2015/245157.htm). 
110 UN GGE 2015, above n.25, para. 31. 
111 Cf. Alexander Klimburg, The Internet Yalta (5 Feb. 2013), 
(www.cnas.org/publications/reports/the-internet-yalta), 7 (“The only hope 
for liberal democracies may well be to go on the offensive: Rather than 
allow the multistakeholder approach to be increasingly squeezed into the 
field of Internet governance alone, the principle should be extended to 
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gradual creation of global governance of cyberspace.112  
 
 
V. Sovereignty in cyberspace 
 
44. Long before the emergence of the Internet, sovereignty had been firmly 
established as a fundamental principle of international law, one that, in the 
words of James Crawford, constitutes “the standard operating assumption of 
a decentralized international system”. 113  However, in the virtual world of 
cyberspace, the notion of sovereignty is controversial, for it may be 
questioned whether and to what degree sovereignty exists in this borderless, 
interconnected domain.114 Although the general applicability of sovereignty in 
cyberspace has by now become part of the international consensus described 
above, 115  China and Western countries nevertheless take divergent views 
regarding its nature in the cyberspace context. 
 45. China is one of the first countries that actively advocated the 
concept of “cyber sovereignty”.116 As an illustration, consider the Chinese 
reaction to Google’s decision to withdraw from China in early 2010 due to its 
dissatisfaction with China’s Internet regulatory measures.117 In response, the 
Chinese government argued that “the Internet is an important infrastructure 
facility for the nation. Within Chinese territory, the Internet is under the 
jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. The Internet sovereignty of China should 
be respected and protected”.118 Similarly, the International Code of Conduct on 
Information Security proposed by China, Russia and other members of the SCO 
in September 2011 stated that “policy authority for Internet-related public 
issues is the sovereign right of States, which have rights and responsibilities 
                                                        
112 See also Paul Cornish, Governing Cyberspace through Constructive 
Ambiguity, 57(3) Survival (2015), 153, 173 (arguing that the application of 
the classical Westphalian conception of sovereignty allows for different 
understandings of cyber governance to coexist rather than conflict with one 
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113 See James Crawford, Sovereignty as a Legal Value, in: James Crawford and 
Martti Koskenniemi (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International 
Law (2012), 132. 
114 See e.g. Barlow, above n.33 (claiming that governments of the industrial 
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115 See paras.11 and 25 above. 
116 In the Chinese context, “cyber sovereignty” is often used interchangeably 
with “Internet sovereignty”. 
117 Google, A New Approach to China (www.google.com/press/new-
approach-to-china). 
118 White Paper on the Internet in China, above n.19. 




for international Internet-related public policy issues”. 119  Following the 
proposal, China continued to promote the idea of “cyber sovereignty”.120 This 
effort culminated in the keynote speech delivered by President Xi Jinping at 
the World Internet Conference in 2015, in which he stressed the importance 
of respecting Internet sovereignty as one of the principles that should be 
adhered to in order to promote global Internet governance system reform. 
According to the president of China, 
 
[w]e should respect the right of each and every country to independently 
choose its internet development path, internet management system, 
internet public policy and to equally participate in governance of 
international cyberspace. We shall not seek internet hegemony, not 
interfere in other’s internal affairs, and not participate in or provide any 
form of support or even encouragement for any internet activities that 
will undermine other’s national security.121  
 
 46. The importance placed by China on cyber sovereignty can be 
explained by two separate but related factors. On the one hand, China relies 
heavily on Internet censorship, and in particular its “great firewall”, to block 
and filter online information which it considers harmful to social stability and 
national security. As in the case of Google’s withdrawal from China in 2010, 
when faced with accusation by Western countries that such policies constitute 
a threat to Internet freedom,122 China justifies them on the basis of cyber 
                                                        
119 Code of Conduct 2011, above n.47.  
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sovereignty is the natural extension of state sovereignty into cyberspace and 
should be respected and upheld; every country is entitled to formulate its 
policies and laws in light of its history, traditions, culture, language and 
customs, and manage the Internet accordingly. Huang Huikang, Working 
Together to Build a Harmonious and Progressive International Cyberspace 
Order 
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sovereignty. For instance, a semi-official piece in the Chinese media observed 
that Western countries resort to similar practices to “censor” Internet 
content.123 In this connection, the proposal of a “Great British Firewall” by 
the UK surveillance agency GCHQ in September 2016 will likely only 
strengthen such tu quoque arguments.124 
 47. On the other hand, in view of the technical advantages and 
capacities of major Western countries like the US, China increasingly resorts 
to cyber sovereignty as a protection from perceived threats. This is so 
especially after the Snowden revelations in 2013, in the context of which it 
was reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) had monitored the 
communications of top Chinese leaders for years. 125  Thus, in a speech 
delivered at the National Congress of Brazil in 2014, President Xi Jinping 
stressed that “[n]o matter how developed a country’s Internet technology is, it 
just cannot violate the information sovereignty of other countries”. 126  He 
described a scenario in which some countries enjoy a secure Internet, while 
others do not, as unacceptable. He added that a State cannot pursue its own 
Internet security at the price of threatening the security of other countries: 
“there are no double standards in the information sector and every country 
has the right to preserve its own information security”.127 
 48. However, the gap between Chinese and Western understandings of 
cyber sovereignty may be narrower than it would appear at first glance. It is 
true that seemingly radical views, including those calling for the establishment 
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(http://gb.cri.cn/other/chinanews/eng140901.pdf). 
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of “Internet borders” and the emergence of a “territorial cyberspace”, may be 
found, especially in opinion pieces published in the Chinese state-run 
media.128 Yet, the official proclamations referred to above do not appear to be 
irreconcilable with the views of Western countries. After all, governments 
have always tried to maintain at least some degree of control over information 
disseminated in their territories.  
 49. In this connection, it should be noted that already the 1865 
International Telegraph Convention contained a clause that States “reserved 
the right to stop any transmission that they considered dangerous for state 
security, or in violation of national laws, public order or morals”.129 Thus, it is 
hardly surprising that the UN GGE’s 2013 consensus report confirmed that 
“State sovereignty and international norms and principles that flow from 
sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-related activities, and to their 
jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within their territory”. 130  The Tallinn 
Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,131 prepared by a group 
of experts from Western countries in 2013, 132 also acknowledges in its very 
                                                        
128 For example, a China Youth Daily editorial called for the establishment of 
“Internet border” in China. See Ye Zheng & Zhao Baoxian, How to fight 
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Sovereignty, Renmin Zhengxie Bao [Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference Daily] (2016), (epaper.rmzxb.com.cn/detail.aspx?id=381711) 
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réservent la faculté d’arrêter la transmission de toute dépêche privée qui 
paraîtrait dangereuse pour la sécurité de l’Etat, ou qui serait contraire aux 
lois du pays, à l’ordre public ou aux bonnes mœurs, à charge d’en avertir 
immédiatement l’expéditeur.”). 
130 UN GGE 2013, above n.23, para.20; see also UN GGE 2015, above n.25, 
para.27. 
131 Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (2013). 
132  In 2017, the Manual was thoroughly revised, extended to cover aspects of 
peacetime international law, and published as Michael N. Schmitt (ed.), 
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first rule that “[a] State may exercise control over cyber infrastructure and 
activities within its sovereign territory”.133 Finally, in a recently issued strategic 
document, “Joint Operating Environment 2035”, 134  the United States 
designated the protection of “its sovereign cyberspace” as a long-term goal 
for its military.135 
 50. Accordingly, it can be argued that the issue of the application of 
sovereignty in cyberspace has now been settled, although China and Western 
countries still have rather different understandings about its precise meaning 
and parameters.136 Western counties, especially the US, have described the 
Chinese emphasis on cyber sovereignty as a threat to Internet freedom that 
could lead to the division of global Internet. In the 2011 International Strategy 
for Cyberspace, the US asserted that free speech and association, privacy, and 
the free flow of information are core principles that should be preserved 
when confronting online challenges.137 For instance, although favoring certain 
“dynamic and adaptable” cybersecurity solutions that “secure systems without 
crippling innovation, suppressing freedom of expression or association, or 
impeding global interoperability”, the document noted that “other 
approaches—such as national-level filters and firewalls—[provide] only an 
illusion of security while hampering the effectiveness and growth of the 
Internet as an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable medium of 
exchange”. 138  The EU appears to share this view. 139  For these Western 
                                                                                                                                
Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Operations (2017). The first and the second author of this article acted in 
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countries, China’s advocacy of cyber sovereignty, particularly its attempts to 
strengthen online content control, constitutes a threat to the openness and 
freedom of cyberspace.140  
 51. In short, with the “return of States”141 in cyberspace comes the 
“return of sovereignty”. Sovereignty will play an increasingly prominent role 
in the debate over the future international order in cyberspace. In the 
meantime, and although they have accepted the application of sovereignty in 
cyberspace, China and Western countries will continue to express different 




VI. International law and the militarization of cyberspace 
 
52. There is no doubt that in addition to its many social and economic 
benefits, the the cyber domain has also resulted in unprecedented 
vulnerabilities. Today, cyber attacks may threaten States’ critical 
infrastructure,142 compromise and disrupt financial flows,143 and even interfere 
with the provision of medical services.144 Malicious cyber operations may thus 
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and Processes in Cyberspace Governance (2007), 111. 
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Network and Steal, The New York Times (12 May 2016), 
(www.nytimes.com/2016/05/13/business/dealbook/swift-global-bank-
network-attack.html). 
144 See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Hacker Can Send Fatal Dose to Hospital Drug 
Pumps, Wired (6 Aug. 2015), (www.wired.com/2015/06/hackers-can-send-
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wreak considerable havoc on entire communities or even States and have 
rightly become the source of concern for top-level policymakers in every 
country. 
 53. The fourth area of apparent divergence relates to the paradigm 
within which such cyber threats should be seen and analysed. Perhaps on 
account of their national security implications, the first significant responses 
to these threats from Western States and scholars were firmly based on a 
military paradigm. This was strongly opposed by others, including prominent 
Chinese State representatives as well as academics. But, as discussed below, 
there are positive signs that suggest this divergence is not irreversible. 
 54. To begin with, perhaps the first comprehensive public 
pronouncement by a State on the framework of responding to malicious 
cyber operations was issued by the US in its 2011 International Strategy for 
Cyberspace:145  
 
When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in 
cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. All states 
possess an inherent right to self-defense, and we recognize that certain 
hostile acts conducted through cyberspace could compel actions under 
the commitments we have with our military treaty partners. We reserve 
the right to use all necessary means—diplomatic, informational, military, 
and economic—as appropriate and consistent with applicable 
international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, 
and our interests.146 
 
 55. This was soon complemented by the US State Department Legal 
Advisor Harold Koh’s detailed speech entitled “International Law in 
Cyberspace”.147 In it, Koh reiterated the US view that a State may respond in 
self-defence to “computer network activities that amount to an armed attack 
or imminent threat thereof”.148 Additionally, he discussed how various law of 
armed conflict (LOAC) rules and principles would apply to inter-State cyber 
operations.149 Strikingly, with the exception of a very minor digression into 
the law of human rights,150 the text’s substantive focus was solely on the law 
on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and LOAC (jus in bello).151 
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 56. Western scholarly discussion of the international law dimension of 
cybersecurity had by that time also treated this domain through the military 
prism. Most of the relevant publications considered whether and under what 
circumstances cyber attacks could be seen as amounting to an armed attack 
triggering the States’ right to resort to self defence152 and examined the related 
question of LOAC’s applicability to cyber operations. 153  This trend of 
associating cyber security with cyber warfare culminated with the publication 
of the highly influential Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare in 2013.154 
 57. The Manual was an effort to identify rules of customary 
international law applicable to cyber warfare undertaken by an international 
group of experts led by Professor Michael Schmitt. As apparent from its title, 
the Manual was firmly based on the military paradigm and focussed almost 
exclusively on the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Apart from nine general 
rules added in the final stages of the project (rules 1–9), the remaining 86 
rules related solely to activities occurring at or above the level of the use of 
                                                                                                                                
armed conflict perspective remains dominant in the US legal thinking about 
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Studies (2002), 172; Michael N. Schmitt, Wired Warfare: Computer 
Network Attack and Jus in Bello, 84 International Review of the Red Cross 
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force (rules 10–95). Although the experts were acting in their personal 
capacity, the Manual project was sponsored by a centre of excellence 
established in Tallinn by NATO, a military alliance.155  
 58. This predominantly Western approach was met with fierce criticism 
from Chinese press, officials, and academics. The US declaration that it will 
respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as to national security threats156 was 
described as amounting to an unwarranted militarization of cyberspace. 157 
Similarly, an early Chinese reaction to the Tallinn Manual accused it of 
“obviously want[ing] to put a cloak of legality on US cyber warfare”.158 A 
particularly significant characterization of the Manual was offered by Ma 
Xinmin, a senior Chinese diplomat and international lawyer. In his view, the 
Manual reflected the view of “[s]ome States” that cyber attacks should be 
analysed through the prism of the military paradigm.159 He continued in a 
highly critical vein: “Yet this ‘military paradigm’ of response to cyberattacks 
disregards the principle of non-use of force in international law and over-
emphasizes such exceptions as the right to self-defense, thus aggravating 
cyberspace militarization and arms race.”160 
 59. In public statements, Chinese officials have repeatedly condemned 
the purported militarization of cyberspace undertaken by the US and other 
Western States.161 They have insisted that any development of China’s military 
capabilities is only a defensive response to the efforts of other countries to 
militarize cyberspace with their offensive capabilities. 162  The credibility of 
such assertions has been questioned by Western analysists. For instance, 
Michael Swaine noted that the distinction between offensive and defensive 
systems is often very difficult to make as “in most cases, ‘offensive’ 
capabilities are developed as an effective and necessary means of defense and 
deterrence”.163 
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 60. Be that as it may, the fact remains that most cyber operations to 
date do not clear the threshold of the use of armed force between States. This 
observation holds even for the most prominent inter-State cyber incidents. 
The series of cyber attacks against Estonia in 2007 caused very little damage 
in the physical world and despite some initial statements to the contrary,164 
even the Estonian government had to eventually admit that it did not have 
sufficient evidence to link the attacks to another State.165 Similarly, although 
the cyber operations against Georgia in 2008 occurred in the context of an 
international armed conflict with Russia, their effect was limited, making the 
application of LOAC to them “highly problematic”.166 Even the (in)famous 
Stuxnet virus, which reportedly destroyed about 20% of Iran’s nuclear 
centrifuges,167 left scholars divided with respect to its legal qualification.168 
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Significantly, the victim State never qualified it as an armed attack or even a 
use of force.169 
 61. Therefore, most (if not all) malicious cyber operations must be 
assessed through the lens of peacetime international law. That being so, some 
of the Chinese criticism seems on point, in particular insofar as it was directed 
at statements by Western States and academics that were based on the military 
paradigm. However, there are a number of indications that the contrast 
between the two positions is not as stark as it might appear. 
 62. Firstly, the focus on the military paradigm has received a fair dose 
of criticism from some Western scholars, as well. Already in 2012, Mary Ellen 
O’Connell excoriated advocates of the positions described above for being 
“trapped by an ideology of militarism” and argued for a de-militarization of 
legal approaches to cyber security.170 Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann also 
argued that we need to look beyond the military paradigm to identify feasible 
solutions to the problem of cyber security. 171  On their analysis, 
countermeasures and the state of necessity provide more viable international 
law alternatives of responding to cyber incidents.172  
 63. Secondly, there is evidence that the tide may be turning even among 
those who might once have been seen as proponents of the supposed military 
paradigm. Professor Schmitt, the chairman of the Tallinn Manual project, has 
since acknowledged that “preoccupation with cyber armed attacks is counter-
                                                                                                                                
that “Stuxnet had scale and effects significant enough to qualify as an armed 
attack”); contrast further with, e.g., David Fidler, Was Stuxnet an Act of 
War? Decoding a Cyberattack, 9(4) IEEE Security & Privacy (2011), 56, 59 
(arguing that as “covert cyberaction”, Stuxnet “didn’t cross the threshold 
into a use of force”); Katharina Ziolkowski, Stuxnet: Legal Considerations, 
25 Journal of International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict (2012), 139, 
147 (suggesting that as a “legal masterpiece”, this operation did not breach 
any rules of international law). 
169 See Iran, Statement by H.E. Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (28 Sept. 2012), (iran-
un.org/en/2012/09/28/28-september-2012-2) (describing cyber attacks 
against Iran’s nuclear facilities as “a manifestation of nuclear terrorism and 
consequently a grave violation of the principles of UN Charter and 
international law” but stopping short from using the language of the jus ad 
bellum). 
170 O’Connell, above n.168, 191. 
171 Robin Geiss and Henning Lahmann, Freedom and Security in Cyberspace: 
Shifting the Focus Away from Military Responses Towards Non-Forcible 
Countermeasures and Collective Threat-Prevention, in: Katharina 
Ziolkowski (ed.), Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace: 
International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy (2013), 621. 
172 Ibid., 628–652. 




experiential”. 173  Moreover, the recently published second edition of the 
Manual (Tallinn Manual 2.0), treats “below-the-threshold” cyber operations 
by addressing many areas of peacetime international law, including State 
responsibility, the law of the sea, international telecommunications law, 
diplomatic law, and even human rights law.174 This strengthens the project’s 
overall relevance and serves to dispel some of the criticism cited above.175 
 64. Thirdly, States seem to be coming closer to one another with 
respect to this issue. On the one hand, China has started to move away from 
its pointed language denouncing the alleged militarization of cyberspace. 
Indeed, in its most recent Defence White Paper, China expressly recognized 
that cyberspace had become “a new domain of national security” and 
committed itself to the expedited development of its cyber military 
capabilities.176 On the other hand, Western States have come to accept that 
the military prism is too limited to effectively meet the diverse challenges 
posed by cyberspace. For instance, a recent statement by the US Director of 
National Intelligence indicates a move away from fanciful concerns about 
cyber warfare to more realistic considerations of cyber security: 
 
Rather than a “Cyber Armageddon” scenario that debilitates the entire 
US infrastructure, we envision something different. We foresee an 
ongoing series of low-to-moderate level cyber attacks from a variety of 
                                                        
173 Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations: The 
Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54(3) Virginia 
JIL (2014), 697, 698. 
174 See Tallinn Manual, above n.131. 
175 It deserves mentioning that compared with the Tallinn Manual in 2013, the 
Tallinn 2.0 process has been more internationalized and inclusive. Besides 
the inclusion of representatives of more than 50 governments from 
different part of the world, including China, in the two governmental 
consultative meetings held in the Hague in 2014 and 2015, the composition 
of the Tallinn 2.0 International Group of Experts has also, for the first time, 
included three non-Western experts (from Thailand, Belarus and China 
respectively), which allowed the voices and perspectives of the non-Western 
world to be reflected in the process. See further Tallinn Manual 2.0, above 
n.132, 2–6. 
176 Xinhua, full text: China’s Military Strategy (26 May 2015), 
(www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_20820628.htm); see 
also International Strategy of Cooperation on Cyberspace. Xinhuanet (1 
Mar. 2017), (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2017-
03/01/c_136094371.htm) (“China will give play to the important role of the 
military in safeguarding the country’s sovereignty, security and development 
interests in cyberspace.”). 
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sources over time, which will impose cumulative costs on US economic 
competitiveness and national security.177 
 
 65. Crucially in this regard, representatives of over 50 States met in 
early 2016 in the context of the so-called Hague Process sponsored by the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the draft text of the second 
edition of the Tallinn Manual.178 Participating States notably included both the 
United States and China, as well as a host of other key cyber powers. 179 
Although the content of the consultations remains confidential,180 the fact of 
such broad participation suggests that the Manual (at least its updated 
version) is no longer viewed as the product solely of the disparaged military 
paradigm.  
 66. In sum, despite some strongly worded statements on both sides, 
the concern that the divide between them is impassable and therefore fosters 
the militarization of cyberspace appears exaggerated. It would be 
unreasonable to expect any major world power to refrain altogether from 
developing military capabilities in the cyber domain. Yet, the vast majority of 
cyber operations—whether State-sponsored or conducted exclusively by non-
State actors—have not and will not exceed the threshold of the use of force 
as understood under international law. Most States now recognize, albeit to 
different degrees, that it is unhelpful to rely on the military paradigm as the 
first port of call when analysing inter-State malicious cyber operations.  
 
 
VII. Cyber espionage and international law 
 
67. Espionage is sometimes described as “the second oldest profession” in 
                                                        
177 US, James R. Clapper, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Cyber Threats 
(10 Sept. 2015), 
(docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/IG00/20150910/103797/HHRG-114-
IG00-Wstate-ClapperJ-20150910.PDF). 
178 NATO CCD COE, Over 50 States Consult Tallinn Manual 2.0 (2 Feb. 
2016), (ccdcoe.org/over-50-states-consult-tallinn-manual-20.html). 
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Hague in 2014 and 2015. According to private conversations between one 
of the present authors and an official from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Chinese government was invited to attend both meetings, and 
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topics in the Tallinn 2.0 process.  
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human history.181 Before the emergence of cyber espionage, the legality of 
espionage as such was the subject of some debate among international legal 
scholars. The majority position is that with the exception of certain limited 
rules, such as those concerning espionage during an international armed 
conflict,182 espionage is largely left unregulated by international law and as 
such it is not internationally unlawful.183 Albeit criminalized in the domestic 
law of nearly every country, as far as the international law is concerned, 
espionage has long been part and parcel of lawful inter-State relations. 
 68. Following the end of the Cold War, in the West there was a 
noticeable shift of concern about espionage from that which is political and 
military in nature to economic espionage, especially when carried out by cyber 
means. For instance, the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace noted: 
 
The persistent theft of intellectual property, whether by criminals, foreign 
firms, or state actors working on their behalf, can erode competitiveness 
in the global economy, and businesses’ opportunities to innovate. The 
United States will take measures to identify and respond to such actions 
to help build an international environment that recognizes such acts as 
unlawful and impermissible, and hold such actors accountable.184 
 
69. General Keith Alexander, then director of the US NSA and commander 
of the US Cyber Command, echoed this concern the following year when he 
claimed that the loss of industrial information and intellectual property 
through cyber espionage constituted the “greatest transfer of wealth in 
history,” and that US companies were losing about $250 billion per year 
through intellectual property theft, with another $114 billion lost due to cyber 
crime.185  
                                                        
181 Simon Chesterman, The Spy Who Came from the Cold War: Intelligence 
and International Law, 27 Michigan JIL (2005-2006), 1072. 
182 See, in particular, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Art. 46. For discussion of 
espionage under the law of armed conflict, see further Christian Schaller, 
Spies, in: Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (2008), online edition (www.mpepil.com), paras.6–12. 
183 See e.g. Christopher Baker, Tolerance of International Espionage: A 
Functional Approach, 19 American University ILR (2003-2004), 1094–1095. 
184 US International Strategy, above n.16, 18. 
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 70. Moreover, the US has accused China of being “the most 
threatening actor in cyberspace”,186 and it was claimed that “[t]he easiest way 
to innovate is to plagiarize” by stealing US intellectual property.187 It is against 
this background that in May 2014, the US indicted five officers of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army188 for “serious cybersecurity breaches against six 
American victim entities”, which represented “the first ever charges against 
known state actors for infiltrating U.S. commercial targets by cyber means”.189 
 71. Meanwhile, after the Snowden revelations in 2013, the cyber 
espionage activities carried out by the United States and some of its Western 
allies—the so-called “Five Eyes” alliance comprising additionally Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom—also attracted worldwide 
attention. The documents released by Snowden revealed that these countries 
had been engaged in a global surveillance programme to collect confidential 
information stored in or transmitted through cyberspace. As mentioned 
earlier, the NSA had reportedly monitored the communications of top 
Chinese leaders for years.190 Interestingly, some NSA documents that were 
leaked seem to suggest that—despite public assurances to the contrary191—
the US and its allies had also engaged in economic espionage against targets in 
                                                        
186 Bloomberg 2012 (www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-11-05/china-
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188 US, District Court-Western District of Pennsylvania, United States of 
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2014), 
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(reporting a statement from the US Department of Defense, according to 
which “[t]he department does ***not*** engage in economic espionage in 
any domain, including cyber.”) (emphasis original). 




Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Russia, and elsewhere.192  
 72. While countries may well criminalize foreign cyber espionage 
activities through domestic law, the enforcement of national criminal laws 
against perpetrators located in foreign jurisdictions is likely to be extremely 
difficult, which renders the protection against transboundary cyber espionage 
to ultimately rest with international law.193 Against this backdrop, countries 
tend to reinterpret international law in relation to cyber espionage in different 
directions. 
 73. On the one hand, the US government and academics have been 
trying to distinguish economic from political espionage in international law, in 
part to justify past and ongoing US conduct. It has been argued that cyber-
enabled intellectual property theft may be treated as a violation of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) 
and brought before the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 194  Additionally, there have been assertions that economically 
motivated espionage amounts to an “act of economic warfare”195, or even that 
it embodies “the newest form of warfare employed by the Chinese 
government [against the US]”.196 
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 74. On the other hand, the Chinese government declared that the 
spying operations of the US had “flagrantly breached international laws, 
seriously infringed upon the human rights and put global cyber-security under 
threat” and “deserve to be rejected and condemned by the whole world”.197 
The Chinese government repeatedly described the accusations by the US and 
some other Western countries as “unfounded” and countered that it was 
actually the main target of cyberattacks.198 Meanwhile, in view of the attempt 
by the US to make a distinction between economic cyber espionage and other 
cyber espionage activities, the Chinese government stressed that it opposed 
what it described as the double standard of some Western countries on the 
issue of cybersecurity, criticizing the US stance as a remnant of “Cold War 
mentality”.199 There have even been suggestions that “China should confront 
the US directly” with evidence of espionage and intrusions directed at 
China.200  
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 75. From the Chinese perspective, it seems justified to argue that there 
is no distinction in international law that disallows economic espionage while 
permitting other forms of espionage.201 Yet, it is equally difficult to claim that 
either cyber espionage in general or the totality of intelligence collection 
operations conducted by the US would be prohibited under international law. 
This is also the official position of the US government. For example, when 
the large-scale online surveillance programs of various US governmental 
departments and agencies attracted widespread criticism, President Obama 
declared that “[w]hile our intelligence agencies will continue to gather 
information about the intentions of governments—as opposed to ordinary 
citizens—around the world, in the same way that the intelligence services of 
every other nation do, we will not apologize because our services may be 
more effective”.202 In a speech delivered in November 2016, Brian Egan, US 
State Department Legal Adviser, expressly noted that the US legal position is 
that “there is no per se prohibition on such activities under customary 
international law”.203 
 76. Therefore, the two positions are in fact less radically different than 
they may first appear. In fact, recent developments reflect a growing 
convergence of the Chinese and Western views on this issue. This was 
reflected during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s State visit to the US in 
September 2015, when the two sides agreed that “neither country’s 
government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of 
intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business 
information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to 
companies or commercial sectors”.204 Similar statements have been also made 
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at bilateral meetings between China and other major Western countries, such 
as the United Kingdom, 205  and at multilateral fora like the G20 Antalya 
Summit in November 2015. 206  Moreover, the United States has been 
vigorously proposing this constraint on economic cyber espionage as one of 
the voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour during peacetime in the 
UN GGE.207 It remains to be seen whether over time a new customary norm 




VIII. Concluding remarks 
 
77. Although philosophers and international law theorists may find the search 
for the precise meaning of the international rule of law vexing,208 in practical 
terms it is a value and a principle shared by the entire international 
community. For instance, in a prominent display of unanimity, member States 
of the UN gathered at the World Summit in 2005 collectively recognized “the 
need for universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at both 
the national and international levels”. 209  In 2012, UN member States 
reaffirmed this commitment to the rule of law in a more detailed declaration, 
again adopted unanimously.210 
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 78. These general proclamations have been echoed in the context of 
international law regulation of cyber activities. Key players on both sides of 
the supposed East-West divide, led respectively by China and the US, have 
affirmed and reaffirmed their commitment to the international rule of law in 
cyberspace. The shared readiness of States to embrace the principle of the 
rule of law likely reflects their growing understanding of common interests 
and of mutual interdependence in the cyber domain. 
 79. However, consensus between China and Western States on the 
general level seems to weaken measurably when particular aspects of the 
regulation of state conduct online are taken into account. Due to this 
perception, scholarly accounts speak of two competing “camps” of countries 
holding divergent views of the crucial facets of the rule of law in 
cyberspace.211 Yet, we submit that this binary depiction is but a part of the 
story, one that is insufficiently nuanced to capture the whole picture. 
 80. We have identified five areas of this supposed divergence. In each 
of them, it may indeed appear at first glance that two competing views have 
emerged, sharply dividing the East from the West. While China has proposed 
binding codes of conduct, Western countries have maintained that existing 
rules of international law suffice. China supposedly believes in 
“multilateralism”, while the US advocates a “multi-stakeholder” approach. 
China is pro-sovereignty; Western States promote Internet freedom. The 
West, led by the US, is said to have adopted a “military paradigm”, which 
China and other countries find unacceptable. Western States have condemned 
supposed Chinese economic cyber espionage, as China protests against the 
more traditional political espionage conducted by the US using cyber means. 
 81. On closer analysis, such black-and-white depictions prove little 
more than a caricature of the actual complex web of positions, views, and 
relationships in this area. To the extent that an overarching trend can be 
identified at all, it is—we submit—one of a trajectory towards convergence. 
Analysis leads to five conclusions.  
 82. Firstly, although States may take different positions on the 
preferred method of identification and development of international law, they 
have reached a consensus on the baseline issue of the applicability of 
international law to cyberspace as such. The prospects of a comprehensive 
binding treaty on cyber security remain dim, but the existence of a plurality of 
diverse non-binding norm initiatives, as well as several recent bilateral 
agreements reached between the main cyber powers, demonstrate that cyber 
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norms development has not ended. 
 83. Secondly, the supposed choice between the multilateral and multi-
stakeholder modes of Internet governance is a false dilemma. Top Chinese 
representatives have acknowledged the importance of multi-stakeholder 
processes and Western countries have allowed the quintessential embodiment 
of multilateralism, the United Nations, to gain ground in cyberspace 
governance. The US release of control over ICANN as well as the growing 
importance of the IGF are two important signs of convergence in this area. 
 84. Thirdly, the importance and role of sovereignty in cyberspace has 
now been recognized by countries across the supposed East/West divide. An 
erstwhile either-or question has become one of degree. In other words, the 
central issue today is the type of State conduct, particularly the extent of State 
online content control, that can be justified by recourse to sovereignty. But 
any suggestion of a “camp” of States rejecting the applicability of the concept 
of sovereignty to cyberspace is simply counterfactual. 
 85. Fourthly, accusations of the militarization of cyberspace are not 
entirely baseless. However, States and scholars alike have gradually realized 
that the so-called military paradigm is unhelpful as the first port of call when 
analysing inter-State malicious cyber operations. Most cyber operations do 
not cross the use of force threshold and must be analysed through the prism 
of peacetime international law. This reality is reflected in recent 
developments, including US statements separating cyber warfare from cyber 
security and the new Tallinn Manual 2.0, with its primary focus on peacetime 
regulation of cyberspace. 
 86. Finally, cyber espionage is (perhaps unsurprisingly) the murkiest of 
the five areas analysed. What is reasonably uncontroversial is that there still is 
no general prohibition of espionage under international law. Additionally, it is 
conceivable that the US has set in motion a process that will at some point 
result in the emergence of a new customary norm constraining the conduct of 
State-sponsored economic (as opposed to political) espionage conducted by 
cyber means. However, for now, statements made in that regard (particularly 
in various bilateral fora) remain too unspecific and unrepresentative to 
amount to expressions of legally relevant opinio juris.212 
 87. All in all, this article maps out the main areas of difference between 
the Western and Chinese approaches to the rule of law in cyberspace. As 
should be apparent, it is inaccurate to describe these two as sharply divided 
and competing camps. Rather, the emerging picture reveals a web of 
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relationships and views that reflect an overall trajectory of convergence, even 
if modest in scope and velocity. Ultimately, all involved States bear 
responsibility for understanding the benefits of collaboration and the dangers 
of isolation in this area. We hope that this article will improve the general 
understanding of the potential and space for convergence and thus 
contribute, at least in small part, to the moderately positive trend it has 
identified. 
